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YOU MADE YOUR BED... NOW YOU ARE GOING TO PAY
FOR IT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS VIRGINIA'S
MANDATORY PATERNAL IDENTIFICATION IN AFDC CASES
WILL HAVE ON THE RIGHTS OF UNWED FATHERS
"Dream child in my head is nightmare born in a borrowed bed."2
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine yourself a young man, and you just learned that your
girlfriend is pregnant. You think to yourself, was it an accident?
Or, did she plan the pregnancy by not taking the precautions the
two of you had agreed to use at the onset of your sexual relation-
ship? This actually happened to Peter Wallis, a thirty-six year-old
real estate broker, who filed suit against his former girlfriend,
Kellie Smith, for breach of contract, fraud, conversion, and prima
facie tort.3 This case has caused a nationwide stir among advocates
of both women's and men's rights.4 Is Mr. Wallis' assumption that
the state will eventually come after him for child support a hasty
presuppogition or an astute precaution? Again, debate on the topic
continues, but at the heart of the matter rests the issues of equal
justice and equal protection under the Constitution.5
1. "We are going to make you pay." Governor Bill Clinton, Acceptance Speech at
Democratic Presidential Nomination Convention (July 16, 1992). This was Governor Bill
Clinton's message in his democratic Presidential nomination acceptance speech to fathers
who owe child support payments. See Michael Marriot, Fathers Find That Child Support
Means Owing More Than Money, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1992, at Al.
2. NATALIE MERCHANT, Eat For Two, on BLIND MAN'S ZOO (Virgin Records 1986).
3. See Wallis v. Smith, No. CV-98-08929 (D.N.M. filed Sept. 16, 1998); see also Bonnie
Erbe, Mother Plus Father Equals Child (Minus Father), CHI. SuN-TIMES, Dec. 1, 1998, at 29,
available in 1998 WL 5609536.
The latest twist in the battle between the sexes comes in the bizarre case of
Peter Wallis and Kellie Smith, who met at work, fell in love, moved in together
and accidentally conceived a child.... [He's suing her for becoming pregnant
against his will and "intentionally acquiring and misusing" his semen.
Id.
4. See Erbe, supra note 3, at 29.
While the beginning of their story was storybook perfect, the end is a classic
contest of wills. It raises melodramatic questions about whose rights prevail
in parenthood. It even makes us ponder whether women have the right to "use"
sperm in ways in which men never intended it to be used and whether in our
high-tech society sperm is becoming just another commodity to be used, stolen,
banked or donated like so much grain and oil.
Id.
5. By not being given the same reproductive rights and protections that women enjoy,
is Peter Wallis being deprived of his right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of justice? See U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
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The modern American woman has more rights and freedoms
than ever before in our nation's history.' She has the power, to
determine her future financially, politically and reproductively.7
With the assistance of sperm donors and fertility clinics, women
may now bear and raise a child without knowing much about the
father, other than what has been represented about him on paper.8
In addition, a woman who gets pregnant has no obligation to tell
the father of the child's existence-until she needs public assis-
tance.9
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall bridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protections of the laws.
Id.; see also Cathy Young, Women Choose, But Men Can't, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 6,
1998, at 6D, available in 1998 WL 18307212 ("For men to fight for the right to desert their
children may seem monstrously selfish. But that's exactly how it looks when some women
fight to abort their potential children.").
6. See MICHAEL D. BAYLES, REPRODUCTIVE ETHICS 35 (1984).
Reasons often given in the past for instrumentally preferring children of one
sex (particularly males) are to inherit, to carry on the family name, and to have
workers. But none of these reasons are relevant in the modern Western world.
Today, male and female children inherit equally. Females can carry on the
family name if they want; they need not change their names when they marry.
Few jobs exist that women cannot fulfill as well as men ....
Id.; see also NGAIRE NAFFINE, LAW AND THE SEXES 136 (1990) ("Today, in most respects,
women appear to be treated as formal equals with men. They are now recogni[z]ed to be
citizens with almost the same rights as men.").
7. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (holding that the Alabama statute that
allowed only wives to receive alimony violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution. Women thereby had the financial right and responsibility to support their
children.). See also Paul Linton, State Equal Rights Amendments: Making a Difference or
Making a Statement?, 70 TEMP. L. REv. 907, 930-31 (1997) ("The common law rule that only
men were liable for support has been broadened to include women. State courts uniformly
have interpreted their equal rights provisions to impose reciprocal and mutual support
obligations upon both husbands and wives.") (citations omitted).
8. See GEORGE P. SMITH, II, FAMILY VALUES AND THE NEW SOCIETY: DILEMMAS OF THE
21ST CENTURY 95 (1998).
It has been determined in a 1990 study that in the United States some eighty
thousand babies are born through artificial insemination by a donor.., each
year. The Congressional Office of Technology Assessment issued a 1988 report
that found over eleven thousand physicians have performed artificial
insemination on approximately 172,000 women each year.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Cindy Richards, In Bizarre Feud, Parents Miss the Point, CHI.
TRIBUNE, Dec. 6, 1998, available in 1998 WL 2923290 at *5 ("A lot of women see men only
as a biological necessity. They think they can pick a man and deceive him. [Wallis'] role was
that of a sperm donor,' [Jeffrey] Leving said. 'Now sperm is just a commodity.'").
9. See Mary A. Totz, What's Good for the Goose Is Good for the Gander: Toward
Recognition of Men's Reproductive Rights, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 141, 143 (1994) ("[Slhould a
mother unilaterally decide to deliver a child, a biological father who had no part in the
decision to carry the child to full term nonetheless becomes jointly responsible for its
financial support."). See, e.g., VA. ADMIN. CODE § 22 VAC 40-35-30 (1998) (explaining that it
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Amidst the wave of welfare reform in the mid-1990s,0 some
states, like Virginia, enacted laws with stringent provisions that
went beyond simply requiring the identification of the father of each
child who receives public assistance." While the novel idea of
shifting the financial burden of supporting children from the
government to the parents would seem to be a viable option for
relieving the pressures on the "public purse," unwed fathers
unfairly have become the targets of this relief.'2
When attempting to determine who bears financial responsibil-
ity for raising a child, federal and state governments have deter-
mined that responsibility lies with both parents.'" Due to the
is mandatory that women identify the father of their child before receiving public assistance).
10. See Ralph S. Hambrick, Jr. & Gary T. Johnson, The Future of Homelessness, SOc'Y,
Sept. 1, 1998, at *15, available in 1998 WL 11168783.
[A] second round of even more stringent requirements and an effort to close the
"loopholes" of the earlier legislation were launched. These resulted in reforms
which made eligibility requirements more stringent and exemptions more
difficult to receive .... There was a "rush to the bottom" in benefits packages
and no state wanted to provide more benefits than its neighbors, for fear of
attracting low-income migrants.
Id.
11. See Leslie Taylor, Judge: 2 Women to Get Welfare for Now, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD
NEWS, June 26, 1996, at Al; see also VA. ADMIN. CODE § 22 VAC 40-35-30 (1998).
A- As a condition of eligibility, the caretaker-relative shall cooperate, as
defined in 22 VAC 40-35-20, with the Division of Child Support
Enforcement (DCSE) and the local department of social services in
establishing paternity.
B. If the caretaker-relative does not cooperate, the adult portion of the grant
shall be denied or terminated until the individual has disclosed the
required information.
C. If, after six months of receipt of AFDC, paternity has not been established
and the local department determines that the caretaker-relative is not
cooperating in establishing paternity, the local department shall terminate
the entire grant for a minimum of one month and until cooperation has
been achieved. An individual whose AFDC case was terminated due to
such non-cooperation must cooperate and file a new application for AFDC
to receive further benefits.
Id. See generally infra notes 64, 67-68 and accompanying text (showing that the meaning of
"cooperating" has been redefined to mean that the mother is able to identify the father by
name and at least three other "characteristics" that might help the state find him).
12. See Roger Levesque, Targeting "Deadbeat' Dads: The Problem with the Direction of
Welfare Reform, 15 HAMINE J. PUB. L. & POLY 1, 9 (1994) [hereinafter Levesque, Targeting
"Deadbeat" Dads] (explaining the recent AFDC goal of forcing unwed fathers to contribute
to public funds while they continue to receive the least amount of benefits).
13. See generally Roger Levesque, Looking to Unwed Dads to Fill the Public Purse: A
Disturbing Wave in Welfare Reform, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 1 (1993-94) [hereinafter
Levesque, Unwed Dads] (establishing the existence of a trend that shifts the burden of
welfare costs from the government to the parents). See also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child
reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.") (citation omitted).
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traditional role men have played as "breadwinners," state welfare
reforms often target unwed fathers as the suggested financial
supporters of children who receive public assistance.14 . This notion,
however, creates a paradox within feminist jurisprudential theory.'5
While today's woman has achieved more rights, both reproductively
and economically, this trend, which places an undue and unsub-
stantiated economic burden on her children's putative father[s],
hinders a woman's independence.' 6
The juxtaposition between a woman's independence and a
man's burden is heightened by the new welfare laws. Some women
are single mothers, either because they and the fathers chose to
have their children out of wedlock or because of a "deadbeat dad"
scenario (where the father chose not to be a part of the child's life).
Some women have chosen unilaterally not to have the father
involved in the child's life. 7 Regardless of the reasons, the new
14. See Levesque, Unwed Dads, supra note 13, at 31.
15. See Carol Smart, Power and Politics of Child Custody, in CHILD CUSTODY AND THE
POLITICS OF GENDER 17 (Carol Smart & Selma Sevenhuisen eds., 1989).
[The] entangling of the new fatherhood and fathers' rights movements is
unfortunate for feminism, even though it is arguably of political benefit for
fathers' rights. This is because the progressive potential of shared parenting
has tended to become overshadowed by the way in which it can be annexed by
a reactionary movement which simply aims further to empower men.
Id.; see also Lynne Marie Kohm, Sex Selection Abortion and the Boomerang Effect of Woman's
Right to Choose: A Paradox of the Skeptics, 4 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 91, 116 (1997)
("[W]hen women, via the constitutional vehicle of privacy, undermine shared societal
concerns with selfish autonomy for the sake of individual liberty, that liberty is transformed
to incongruity and self-contradiction; thus the paradox."); Nancy Levit, Feminism For Men:
Legal Ideology and the Construction of Maleness, 43 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1037, 1042 (1996) ("The
goals of liberal feminism were assimilationist in nature: making legal claims that would
ensure women received the same rights, opportunities, and treatment as men .... Equal
treatment theory viewed men as the benchmark, the norm. Male experiences were an
accepted and unquestioned reference point."). Thus, in failing to give men equal grounds for
asserting their reproductive rights, feminist ideals are shattered as the heretofore male
benchmark of sexual independence is'essentially "surpassed" by women's unilateral rights
to reproduce.
16. See generally supra note 15 (explaining the paradox between giving women unilateral
rights to reproduce and the progression of feminist legal theory); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (granting women more reproductive freedoms).
17. Some women fear their domestic partners' physical or emotional abuse or simply do
not want the fathers to be a part of their lives because of their choice of lifestyle. See Linda
J. Lacey, Book Review, As American as Parenthood and Apple Pie: Neutered Mothers,
Breadwinning Fathers and Welfare Rhetoric, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 79, 95 (1996) ([It seems
clear that for the children of the approximately three to four million women beaten by their
husbands or boyfriends every year, a single parent family is preferable to a violent home.")
(citations omitted); see also Monthly Vital Statistics Report, Vol. 46, No. 1, Supp. 2 (visited
Jan. 20, 1999) <httpJ/www.cdc.gov/nchswww/fastats/virginia.htm> (stating that in 1996, in
Virginia, 28.8% of children were born to unwed mothers while the national percentage was
32%); infra notes 27, 31 (noting the rise in single-parent households and detailing the
reasons for the rise).
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welfare laws generally are not considered when parents make
reproductive and economic decisions about having a child. How-
ever, in the instance where a mother cannot afford to support her
child, the new welfare laws make it impossible for a father to be
relieved of the economic burden of that child.'
8
This Note primarily concerns itself with the fundamental
unfairness of requiring unwilling or unknown fathers to support
children, and their mothers, when they are entitled to no other
parental rights. This Note also discusses the importance of
achieving true equality for both men and women in the areas of
reproductive and economic rights. The current trend has removed
the role of the complete family unit in child-rearing by giving
reproductive freedoms to women alone."9 While the progression
away from the family20 may be partially responsible for this
distinction, the rights of unwed fathers have also been long
forgotten. Still, irrespective of the rights of unwed fathers, society
remembers their responsibilities and, in the evolving age of
mandatory paternal identification, society aggressively places the
financial burden on these putative fathers. Finally, as this Note
discusses the need to recognize the rights of unwed fathers, both
reproductively and financially, it also proposes possible solutions in
the wake of these situations.
II. HISTORY OF THE TREND TARGETING UNWED FATHERS IN
WELFARE REFORM
'That is no excuse,' replied Mr. Brownlow .... 'for the law
supposes that your wife acts under your direction.' 'If the law
supposes that,' said Mr. Bumble,... 'the law is a ass-an idiot.
If that's the eye of the law, the law is a bachelor; and the worst
18. See, e.g., State Dep't of Human Serv. v. T.D.G., 861 P.2d 990, 994 (Okla. 1993)
(holding that a mother could not contract away her child's right to child support).
19. See Lacey, supra note 17, at 79; see also MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S
DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 112-15 (1996) (noting the rise in
single-parent families and the evolution of notions of personhood independent from marital
status). See generally Naomi R. Cahn, Review Essay, The Moral Complexities of Family Law,
50 STAN. L. REV. 225 (1997) (examining the moral complexities within the current trend of
moving away from the "traditional family," as well as the subsequent fears of moral
degeneracy and family breakdown resulting from support for welfare reform).
20. See SMITH, supra note 8, at 1 (-While recognizing family, and parenthood, are linked,
ideally to form the 'good life,' it remains a vexatious conundrum to find agreement on the
content of these terms as they evolve in contemporary society.") (citations omitted); see also
Lacey, supra note 17, at 91-96 (discussing the change in the modern family, and the reasons
behind the current decline of the "traditional" nuclear family).
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I wish the law is, that his eye may be opened by experience-by
experience.''
American society has moved away from maintaining a delicate
balance between individual rights and familial rights to a more
"individualistic" approach in defining protected rights.22  This
concept lies at the heart of an unwed father's responsibility-he is
only the financial provider for the child. His child's mother has the
power to make decisions while he has the results of her choices
thrust upon him.23  With visitation rights, custody, and child
support, an unwed father has no say, reproductively or economi-
cally, about the direction the mother's actions will take him.24
A. An Overview of the Federal Government's Role in Welfare
Originally designed to assist widowed mothers, the Aid to
Families with Dependant Children program (hereinafter AFDC)25
transformed itself, over the years, into a vehicle to support unwed
mothers with illegitimate children.26 With this trend in mind,
Congress has recognized a continuing need to support children
living in poverty.
21. CHARLES DICKENS, THE ADVENTURES OF OLIVER TWIST 399 (Oxford University Press
1966) (1837).
22. See supra note 19 and accompanying text; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(defining a woman's liberty interest in relation to the state's interest, and not in relation to
her family).
23. See Totz, supra note 9, at 148 ("Generally, once a pregnant woman makes a decision
regarding a fetus, the father is completely bound by the consequences of her decision. This
is true despite the fact that the male progenitor was given no input into the procreative
decision....").
24. See id. at 143 ("[S]hould a mother unilaterally decide to deliver a child, a biological
father who had no part in the decision to carry the child to full term nonetheless becomes
jointly responsible for its financial support.").
25. While it is important to note that the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1305, re-titled the "Aid for Families with Dependant Children"
(AFDC) program to "Temporary Assistance for Needy Families" (TANF), this Note will
discuss welfare issues by referring to AFDC, as it was in response to the AFDC mandates
that caused Virginia to act initially. Additionally, in spite of the linguistic change at the
federal level, Virginia has continued to refer to its welfare program as AFDC.
26. See Levesque, Targeting "Deadbeat" Dads, supra note 12, at 6 (discussing the original
use of the "unworthy person standard" with early welfare recipients by characterizing the
mother's moral character as a measurement of her "worthiness" to receive publicly assisted
funds. Some women who were considered "morally unworthy" were not able to receive
funding); see also WINIFRED BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN 174-98 (1965) (discussing
the usual starting point for the early focus on "suitable home" policies).
27. See Levesque, Targeting "Deadbeat"Dads, supra note 12, at 9 (noting that the history
of AFDC, current amendments, and proposals reveal that the focus and use of the worthy
person standard has materially shifted from the unwed mother and her illegitimate children
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In the late 1960s, three events significantly changed the
welfare system. First, the Supreme Court rejected the "worthy
person" standard in favor of a "more sophisticated and enlightened
[standard],"28 namely that of maintaining the family unit. Second,
the Supreme Court began to enforce welfare eligibility provisions
through the same concepts as the civil rights movement.2 9 Third,
Congress extended the eligibility for AFDC support to mothers of
the beneficiaries. 30
These changes in the welfare law ballooned the cost of AFDC,
as the number of benefit recipients increased dramatically.3' In
response to this progression, remedial changes in the 1970s largely
reversed the welfare rights movement and brought about the
reemergence of the "worthy person standard." 2 Congress, however,
took a new approach to the standard by targeting fathers for child
support.33 Despite Congress' efforts, the Department of Health and
Human Services did not adequately regulate or monitor the states'
implementations of the federal child support program. Only after
welfare rolls became overburdened did Congress finally address this
issue.34
to the unwed father and his illegitimate family); see also JENNY TEICHMAN, ILLEGITIMACY 1
(1982) (noting that the Oxford English Dictionary defines "illegitimacy" as "not correctly
deduced or inferred."); Andrew Bush, Fathers and Welfare Reform, THE PUBLIC INTEREST,
Sept. 22, 1997, at Al (emphasizing that today an increasing number of children are born
illegitimate, with either no "father" to speak of or to mothers who are not wed to their
biological fathers).
28. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 325 (1968) (determining that the "paramount goal" of
AFDC is to maintain and strengthen the family).
29. See David Rosenbloom, The Great Society and the Growth of 'Juridical Federalism-
Protecting Civil Rights and Welfare, in THE GREAT SOCIETY AND ITS LEGACY 208 (Marshall
Kaplan & Peggy L. Cuciti eds., 1986) (presenting an overview of the increased use of the
federal judiciary to protect welfare rights).
30. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601, 606(b) (1988).
31. As a result of the changes, only about 3.5% of those children receiving AFDC aid had
a deceased father. Approximately 76% of all single-parent families were the result of divorce
or extended separation. In addition, illegitimacy accounted for about 20% of single-parent
families. See Brian L. Calistri, Note, Child Support and Welfare Reform: The Child Support
Enforcement Provisions of the Family Support Act of 1988, 16 J. LEGIS. 191, 192-93 (1990).
32. See S. REP. 1356, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 8146-48 (explaining the
reemergence of the worthy person ideology).
33. See Levesque, Targeting 'Deadbeat" Dads, supra note 12, at 12.
The 1974 Congressional amendment, Title IV-D, essentially established the
federal government as an overseer, standard-bearer, and benefactor of child
support enforcement. By 1975, the essential features of the current welfare
child support system---compulsory participation and the assignment of rights
to the state-were added to the Social Security Act.
Id. (citations omitted).
34. See id.
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A decade later, after realizing that a general standard alone
was insufficient, Congress implemented measures requiring states
to hone their laws and to strengthen enforcement powers for their
child support programs.35 In 1996, as part of the Republican
Congress' "Contract with America," Congress passed several
controversial reforms to the existing welfare regulations, including:
(1) implementing wage withholding; (2) changing the states' uses of
child support guidelines; and (3) implementing measures requiring
the establishment of paternity.36 Through these reforms in the
federal welfare program, some scholars argue that the federal
government attempted to reconstruct "traditional family values."37
In June of 1996, an Executive Order issued by President
Clinton set forth the mandate that mothers seeking public assis-
tance must identify the fathers of their children.3 1 "His order
defined cooperation as giving the name, address, Social Security
number, place of employment and names of relatives."39  The
definition of "cooperation," however, remained for the most part, in
the states' discretion.4" In more specific state regulations, the
definition of cooperation has delved into providing the actual
whereabouts of the putative father, rather than simply requiring
the "name" of the individual.41 The "step-up" in this legislation has
given the states greater power to deny welfare benefits to "uncooper-
ative" mothers while also giving the welfare agencies more tools by
35. See Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988) (codified
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (making use of staggered implementation of child support
enforcement); see also STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 101ST CONG., 1ST
SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988 (Comm. Print 1989);
Child Support Enforcement Act of 1992: Hearing on S. 2343 Before Subcomm. of Children,
Family, Drugs and Alcoholism of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. 67-69 (1992) (testimony and prepared statement of Irwin Garfinkel) (finding
that child support enforcement continues to fail because agencies are underfunded and
understaffed, caseloads are unmanageably high, child support workers lack training, and
parents are unable to be located and pursued).
36. See supra note 35 (explaining the reasoning behind the passage of the numerous
welfare reforms).
37. See Elaine Sorenson & Robert Lerman, Welfare Reform and Low-Income Noncusto-
dial Fathers, CHALLENGE, July/Aug. 1998, at 101, 103-04.
38. Federal regulations historically defined cooperation in establishing paternity to
include providing information reasonably obtainable by the recipient and under penalty of
perjury. See 45 C.F.R. § 232.12(b) (removed Dec. 5, 1997). The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit stated: "tlo give meaning to the inclusion of the attestation in definition of
cooperation, an attestation of lack of information should create a presumption of cooperation
that may be overcome by showing that the attestation was false, or that the applicant failed
to cooperate in [another] respect under 45 C.F.R. § 232.12(b)." Tomas v. Rubin, 926 F.2d 906,
910 (9th Cir. 1991).
39. Taylor, supra note 11, at Al.
40. See Levesque, Unwed Dads, supra note 13, at 13.
41. See, e.g., VA. ADMIN. CODE § 22 VAC 40-35-30 (1998).
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which to locate the putative fathers.4" Through their legislative
action, "Congress nevertheless concluded that financial responsibil-
ity for welfare children could be transferred from the government
to the children's fathers."43
B. Analysis of the Trends in Welfare Reform on a Federal Level
The new focus on supporting the child out of the father's
pocket, rather than the mother's, is quickly becoming the easiest
way for states to regulate welfare disbursement." For example,
stringent requirements for paternal identification demonstrate the
power that mothers have in determining the financial fate of their
child's father.45 Once the mother has "cooperated in identifying the
father," the burden then shifts to the father to disprove his
paternity.46
With an increasing number of children born out-of-wedlock
each year,47 and with the growing cultural acceptance of single-
parent families,48 the idea of a mother, a father and 2.5 children no
longer fits the "traditional" nuclear family mold. 49 As a result of the
42. See id. (explaining that the state will revoke some, if not all, of the portion of the
mother's welfare benefits if the mother is unable to "cooperate" within six months of
receiving the aid).
43. Levesque, Targeting "Deadbeat"Dads, supra note 12, at 31.
44. See id.
45. Women have the power to identify, or not to identify, the fathers of their children,
if they know their identity. In Virginia, for instance, the state will revoke some, if not all,
of their welfare subsidy if the mother does not cooperate in naming the father. See generally
VIRGINIA DEIT OF SOCIAL SERV., AFDC MANUAL § 201.10 (requiring that after the father is
preliminarily identified through information given by the mother, the putative father must
then refute the accusation of his paternity, normally by submitting to a blood test).
46. Id.
47. See Ken Bryson, Household and Family Characteristics: March 1997, in CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS § P20-520, at 1 (April 1998). While the 1990s have been relatively
stable with respect to family status, the rapid decline of the traditional American family
dipped most sharply between 1970 and 1990 (from 40% to 26%). By contrast, however, the
percentage of family groups with a never-married mother has increased sharply from 33%
in 1990 to 41% in 1997. See id.
48. See Ken Bryson, Household and Family Characteristics: March 1995, in CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS § P20-488, at 1 (Oct. 1996). In 1970, 5 to 6 million families were
maintained by women with no husbands present, as compared to the 12.2 million families
in 1995. See id.
49. An increasing number of children do not live in the traditional nuclear family,
consisting of a mother, a father, and children under the age of eighteen. In 1995, only 25%
of households were composed of married couples with children under the age of eighteen, as
compared to 40% in 1970. See id. Since 1970, the number of female-householder families
has increased by 122% (from 5.5 million to 12.8 million). The number of male-householder
families grew by 213% (from 1.2 million to 3.8 million). See Ken Bryson, Household and
Family Characteristics: March 1997, in CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS § P20-509, at 3 (April
1998); see also Ken Bryson, Household and Family Characteristics: March 1995, in CURRENT
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growing acceptance of these "non-traditional" families, the children'
are often born into poverty and require the assistance of federal
funds to support both their mothers and themselves.5 0 The change
in the "typical" family begs the inquiry of where are the fathers?
Indeed, does the mother even know who the father of her child is?
Because women bear and deliver children, identifying the mother
is easy. Yet, even when a good indication of who fathered the child
exists, proving paternity is more elusive. 5
While the movement away from the traditional nuclear family
may expand women's rights, the trend simultaneously severs men's
rights.52 As this trend continues, the danger of "forgetting" unwed
fathers may lead to laws that create further undue burdens on
these fathers.5 3
POPULATION REPORTS § P20-488, at 3 (Oct. 1996) (stating that 12.2 million households were
maintained by women with no husbands present (29% of all households)) (emphasis added).
50. "Over the past several decades, the composition of households has changed
significantly due to changes in the age structure of the population and the changes in social
values." Ken Bryson, Household and Family Characteristics: March 1995, in CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS § P20-488, at 1 (Oct. 1996).
51. See A v. X, Y v. Z, 641 P.2d 1222, 1225 (Wyo. 1982) (denying a putative father
adjudication of paternity of a child born out of wedlock while the mother was married to
another man); see also Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 268-69 (1978) ("That the child is the child
of a particular woman is rarely difficult to prove. Proof of paternity, by contrast, frequently
is difficult when the father is not part of a formal family unit.").
52. Society's movement away from the "traditional family" brings a financial burden to
unwed fathers, yet supports the women it once shunned. See, e.g., McCullough v.
McCullough, 760 F. Supp. 613 (1991) (noting that the court denied visitation for the father,
but required child support payments because of his abusive background, thereby severing
his rights, but maintaining the father's monetary contribution). See also Levesque, Target-
ing "Deadbeat" Dads, supra note 12, at 27 ("Two important trends have radically transformed
the American family: (1) the dramatic increase in the proportion of children living with only
one parent; and (2) the increasing difficulty of supporting a family with children on just one
income. Social policy has not kept up with these trends.").
53. Cf Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2819 (1992). The Court stated that
'[o]nly where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability to make this
[personal] decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of the protected liberty."
Id. However,
[a] husband has no enforceable right to require a wife to advise him before she
exercises her personal choices ... [wiomen do not lose their constitutionally
protected liberty when they marry. The Constitution protects all individuals,
male or female, married or unmarried, from the abuse of governmental power,
even where the power is employed for the supposed benefit of a member of the
individual's [family].
Id. at 2831.
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C. Virginia's Responses to the Welfare Reform
As early as 1976, Virginia enacted requirements for a proposed
welfare program.54 According to Virginia law, eligibility for the
AFDC program requires: (1) furnishing of a Social Security num-
ber for the recipient; (2) assigning the child's right to income to the
state; and (3) cooperating in identifying and locating parents and/or
monies to assist with the state's contribution to that appli-
cant's/recipient's aid."5 These primary requirements, however, were
insufficient to relieve the state of its heavy burden of funding for
the impoverished.56
In 1994, the Virginia Assembly amended the welfare law by
adding a "good cause" exception for women who were unsure of the
identity of their children's fathers.57 In the Welfare Reform Act of
1995, Virginia also attempted to redefine the role that a father
should play in his child's life.5 8 At that time, President Clinton
54. See 1976 Va. Acts ch. 215 § 63.1-105.1 (describing requirements for receiving aid).
To be eligible for payment for aid to dependant children, an applicant or
recipient shall:
1. Furnish, apply for or have an application made in his behalf for, a Social
Security account number to be used in the administration of the program;
2. Assign the State any rights to support from any other person such
applicant may have in his own behalf of any other family member for
whom such applicant is applying for or receiving aid and which have
accrued at the time such assignment is executed;
3. Cooperate in (i) identifying and locating the parent with respect to whom
aid is claimed, (ii) establishing paternity of a child born out of wedlock
with respect to whom aid is claimed, (iii) obtaining support payments for
such applicant or recipient and for a child with respect to whom aid is
claimed and (iv) obtaining any other payments or property due such
applicant or recipient of such child.
Id.
55. See id.
56. See Floor Debate on HB 1030 Before the Virginia House of Delegates, 1994 Reg. Sess.
(Feb. 10, 1994) [hereinafter 1994 Floor Debate] (statement of Gentleman Fisher) (Jay Sears
News Service 1994) (on file with the Virginia House of Delegates) (explaining that the 1994
bill "tightens up... provisions in an attempt to find the parents of children who are being
claimed [under AFDC].").
57. See id.; see also 1994 Va. Acts ch. 934. The new third section reads:
Identify the parents of the child for whom aid is claimed, subject to the "good
cause" provisions or exceptions in federal law or regulations. However, this
requirement shall not apply if the applicant or recipient submits a statement
under penalty of perjury that the identity of the parent is not reasonably
ascertainable and the local department of social services is aware of no other
evidence which would refute such statement ....
Id.; The Assembly also removed the requirement that the applicant cooperate in identifying
the other parent. Now the Code only requires cooperation in locating the parent. See id.
58. See 1995 Va.. Acts ch. 450. The Assembly amended the Virginia Code and struck the
language requiring that the "applicant or recipient submit[ ] a statement under penalty of
perjury that the identity of the parent is not reasonably ascertainable and the local
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granted Virginia a waiver from the federal welfare regulations,
giving the state the option to sanction women who would not, or
could not, cooperate as the state dictated.59 The new law redefined
the primary eligibility requirements for AFDC, requiring not just
a simple identification of the potential father, but also "cooperation
in locating him."0 At the time, Virginia was one of only thirteen
states to enact this mandatory and strict compliance to the federal
suggestions.
The most recent changes to the AFDC program in Virginia
came in 1996, when amendments to the Virginia Code, § 63.1-105.1,
made obtaining aid even more difficult.62 The law indicates that in
order
[t]o be eligible for payments for aid to families with dependant
children, an applicant or recipient shall:
3. Identify the parents of the child for whom aid is claimed,
subject to the "good cause", provisions or exceptions in federal
department of social services is aware of no other evidence which would refute such
statement ..... Id. In its place the Assembly added the following language:
If paternity is not established after six months of receipt of AFDC, the local
department may suspend the entire grant or the adult portion of the grant,
subject to regulations promulgated by the State Board, in cases where the local
department determines that the recipient is not cooperating in the
establishment of paternity.
Id.; see also Floor Debate on HB 2001 Before the Virginia House of Delegates, 1995 Reg. Sess.
(Feb. 7, 1995) [hereinafter 1995 Floor Debate] (statement of Gentleman Brickley) (Jay Sears
News Service 1995) (on file with the Virginia House of Delegates) (explaining that the 1994
welfare reform bill was among the toughest in the Nation); Id. (statement of Gentleman
Bennett) (Jay Sears News Service 1995) (on file with the Virginia House of Delegates)
(explaining that the principles adopted in the 1994 bill included the belief"that a stable, two-
parent family is the best defense against poverty and that parents have a moral and legal
obligation to be responsible adults and to support their children.").
59. See Taylor, supra note 11, at Al; see generally 1995 Floor Debate, supra note 58
(statement of Gentleman Brickley) (Jay Sears News Service 1995) (on file with the Virginia
House of Delegates) (explaining the necessity and history of the Presidential waiver with
respect to evolving welfare reform programs in state legislation).
60. Taylor, supra note 11, at Al; see also 1995 Floor Debate, supra note 58 (statement
of Gentleman McDonnell) (Jay Sears News Service 1995) (on file with the Virginia House of
Delegates) (arguing that the addition of the requirement to cooperate in locating the parents
of AFDC recipients had as its primary goals for effective welfare reform: (1) accountability
and self-reliance of participants; (2) provision of services necessary to make the transition
from welfare to work; and (3) an assurance of savings for the Virginia taxpayers).
61. See Taylor, supra note 11, at Al.
62. See VA. ADMIN. CODE § 22 VAC 40-35-30(C) (1998) (dictating "if, after six months of
receipt of AFDC, paternity has not been established and the local [D]epartment [of Social
Services] determines that the caretaker-relative is not cooperating in establishing paternity,
the local department shall terminate the entire grant for a minimum of one month and until
cooperation has been achieved.") (emphasis added).
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law or regulations. However, this requirement shall not apply
if the child is in a foster care placement or if the local depart-
ment determines, based upon the sworn statement of the
applicant or recipient or of another person with knowledge of
the circumstances, that the child was conceived as the result of
incest or rape; and
4. Cooperate in (i) locating the parent of the child with respect
to whom aid is claimed, (ii) establishing the paternity of a child
born out of wedlock with respect to whom aid is claimed, (iii)
obtaining support payments for such applicant or recipient and
for a child with respect to whom aid is claimed, and (iv) obtain-
ing any other payments or property due such applicant or
recipient of such child.
Any applicant or recipient who intentionally misidentifies
another person as a parent shall be guilty of pejury and, upon
conviction therefor, shall be punished ....
Because 1996 was the last year Virginia reevaluated its welfare
reform prdgram, it is important to look to the program's enforce-
ment, as well as its effects and intended effects on the recipients, to
see the "reality" of the changes in the system.
D. Enforcement by Virginia's Department of Social Services
The Virginia Department of Social Services, in order to enforce
the welfare reform program, has implemented standards that
disallow the claim, "I don't know who the father is."6 The change
from a "good cause" requirement to the more strict standard of
"cooperating under penalty of perjury" has created the increased
63. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-105.1 (Michie 1998); see also Floor Debate on HB 1069 Before
the Virginia House of Delegates, 1996 Reg. Sess. (Feb. 8, 1996) (statement of Gentlewoman
Cunningham) (Jay Sears News Service 1996) (on file with the Virginia House of Delegates)
(explaining that the bill was to make it clear that cases of incest or rape would be 'good cause'
exceptions to the paternal identification cooperation requirement).
64. See VIRGINIA DEPT OF SOC. SERV., AFDC MANUAL § 201.10 (1998):
COOPERATION IN OBTAINING SUPPORT:
As a condition of eligibility, each applicant/recipient of AFDC must cooperate
with the Division of Child Support Enforcement (DCSE) or local department of
social services, *** unless good cause for refusing to do so is determined to
exist, **** in:
" identifying the parent for whom aid is claimed;
" establishing paternity of a child born out-of-wedlock for whom aid is claimed;
" obtaining support payments for the applicant of recipient and for a child for
whom aid is claimed; and
" obtaining any other payments or property due the applicant or recipient or
the child.
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potential for penalties, as these penalties now can extend to the
whole family, rather than just to the mother who violates the
cooperation standard.65
Under regulations from the Virginia Department of Social
Services,
in order to be found eligible to receive AFDC, a child must meet
certain financial and categorical eligibility requirements. One
such categorical requirement is that the child must be deprived
of parental care and support by reason of death, continued
absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a
parent.66
In the AFDC Manual, the requirements for cooperation are strict
and inflexible, requiring that even if a mother does not know the
identity of the father of her child [ren], she must fill out a form titled
"List of Putative Fathers."" The custodial parent must provide at
least three of the following pieces of information about the noncus-
todial parent: (1) social security number; (2) race; (3) date of birth;
(4) place of birth; (5) telephone number; (6) address; (7) schools
attended; (8) occupation; (9) employer; (10) driver's license number;
(11) make and model of motor vehicle; (12) motor vehicle license
plate number; (13) places of social contact; (14) banking institutions
utilized; (15) names, addresses, or telephone numbers of parents,
friends or relatives; or (16) other information that the agency
determines is likely to lead to the establishment of paternity.
68
Under these heightened standards, the Department of Social
Services, in accordance with Virginia's legislation, created a
"barrier," such that unwed fathers could not avoid economic
responsibility for illegitimate children who were being supported by
state aid. While no gender distinction in the Virginia laws exists,
the focus on the noncustodial parent creates an undue burden on
unwed fathers who may not even be aware that they are partially
65. See Taylor, supra note 11, at Al (explaining that a mother who violates the standard
will lose all of her aid, rather than just the aid for the child about whom she failed to supply
information).
66. VA. ADMIN. CODE § 22 VAC 40-530-20(B) (defining "continued absence" in part as
being unestablished paternity).
67. See VIRGINIA DEP'T OF SOC. SERV., AFDC MANUAL § 201.10(A)(1)(a)(2). The manual
explains that if the mother lists two putative fathers, she is cooperating. If neither man
turns out to be the father, the mother is viewed as not cooperating, until paternity is
established.
68. See id.§ 201.10(A)(1)(b).
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responsible for the life of the child.69 Regardless of whether a
biological father wants to be a father, he is, by Virginia's standards,
unquestionably responsible for the child's economic well being. It
is clear that both the Virginia Legislature and the enforcement
division have identified a financial void and are seeking to fill it
through the unwed father's wallet.70
III. ALL OF THE BURDEN AND NONE OF THE BENEFIT
Unwed, unnotified fathers have been deprived of the ability to
offer input in determining the future of their children but are
nonetheless expected to provide the primary financial support for
their children.7 "[TIoday, the law places an absolute economic
burden on the man, and then, figuratively speaking, slices [his]
reproductive capacity by affording him unequal protection in
deciding whether to bear or beget a child."
72
From abortion to adoption, and even in the area of presumption
of paternity laws, unwed fathers have very little say regarding the
lives of their children.73 Because in most instances both the burden
and benefit of making reproductive decisions fall on the mother,
unwed fathers are generally given little or no say in any of these
decisions. For a father who wishes to raise his child, it is hardly
fair that the child's mother may choose, at times unilaterally, to
abort the child or to give the child up for adoption. Conversely, a
man who does not want to be a father is forced into fatherhood in
order to satisfy the mother's wish to keep the baby.74
A. Fathers' Rights and Abortion
Roe v. Wade75 clearly established that an "adult woman has an
untrammeled constitutional right to choose an abortion in the first
69. See Levesque, Targeting "Deadbeat"Dads, supra note 12, at 36 (explaining that men
are typically the noncustodial parent).
70. See supra note 60 (explaining the legislative intent behind relieving taxpayers of the
burden of paying for AFDC recipient children). But see Levesque, Targeting 'Deadbeat"
Dads, supra note 12, at 21 (noting that the fathers are not generally the best way to obtain
financial support for their children).
71. See supra note 60.
72. Totz, supra note 9, at 145.
73. See infra notes 78, 81, 101-03, 110 and accompanying text (explaining how in the
areas of abortion, adoption and the presumption of paternity, unwed fathers, and sometimes
even wedded fathers, have, at times, had no choice in the future of their children once the
mothers made a decision).
74. See Levesque, Targeting "Deadbeat" Dads, supra note 12, at 41-43.
75. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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trimester .... The Court has never upheld a potential father's
arguable right to stop an abortion."7" With courts placing the
abortion right unilaterally in a woman's hands, a man's reproduc-
tive rights are essentially destroyed." If a man, married or not,
desires to raise a child whom the mother wishes to abort, he is
unlikely to be able to legally compel her to bear the child.7" Because
the Supreme Court established that the right to abort an unborn
child unilaterally belongs to the woman,79 a man has no say in the
choices made by the mother of his child.
This unilateral power that women possess destroys any
reproductive right of her child's father. In Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, ° while the Supreme Court upheld several restrictions on
abortion, it held that the mother does not have to tell her husband
she plans to have an abortion.8 ' Casey reiterated the fact that a
woman's abortion rights are unilateral and protected by her privacy
interests, consequently failing to consider the effects that such
unilateral decisions have on potential fathers. In contrast,
however, if a woman decides not to have an abortion, her male
counterpart has no right to compel her to undergo the procedure.
Yet, he is financially obligated to support both mother and child8 2
B. Fathers' Rights and Adoption
While a man has no say in a woman's decision to abort a child,
his rights expand if the woman chooses to give birth. When a
woman has decided to bear her child, but plans to give that child up
for adoption, the courts have responded with more supportive views
76. Andrea M. Sharrin, Potential Fathers and Abortion: A Woman's Womb Is Not a
Man's Castle, 55 BROOK L. REV. 1359, 1359-62 (1990).
77. See Totz, supra note 9, at 144-45.
78. See generally Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E.2d 128 (Mass. 1974) (holding that an estranged
husband has no statutory or constitutional right to decide whether a fetus should be aborted);
Rothenberger v. Doe, 374 A.2d 57 (N.J. 1977) (refusing to grant a husband's petition to enjoin
his wife from having an abortion); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 788 P.2d. 1044 (Utah 1990)
(granting a husband a restraining order to stop his wife from having an abortion, which was
later dissolved by a higher Utah court); Coleman v. Coleman, 471 A.2d 1115, 1119 (Md. 1984)
(holding that a husband is "constitutionally prohibited from enjoining the abortion of the
wife.").
79. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
80. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
81. See id. at 853 (finding that for women who would not tell their husbands voluntarily
about an abortion, forcing them to tell their husbands would be an undue burden on their
liberty interests, which they did not resign upon marriage).
82. See generally State Dep't of Human Serv. v. T.D.G., 861 P.2d 996 (Okla. 1992)
(explaining that a mother cannot contract away her child's right to child support).
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of a putative father's rights.83 Prior to 1972, putative fathers had
few or no rights concerning the adoption of their children." In
Stanley v. Illinois,5 the Supreme Court first recognized the
existence of a putative father's right to custody, even when he was
not married to the mother.8 6 In Stanley, the putative father lived
with the mother for eighteen years and maintained essentially the
same relationship with his children as if he had married their
mother.8 7 Before granting the father paternal rights, however, the
Court first determined the father's fitness as a parent.88 To
determine whether the father should have some legal rights to the
custody of his children, the Court examined factors such as his
relationship with the children and his relationship with their
mother.89
In Quilloin v. Walcott,9" the relationship between the child's
mother and father was not established because they were not
cohabiting. In this case, the Supreme Court refused to extend
constitutional protection to the putative father strictly based on
biological parentage.9 ' The Quilloin decision limited Stanley to
apply only where a "familial relationship" existed.92
One year later, in Caban v. Mohammed,s3 the Court relied on
Quilloin to uphold the natural father's parental rights. Although
never legally married, Caban and Mohammed lived together for five
83. A putative father is defined as "[tihe alleged or reputed father of a child born out of
wedlock." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1237 (6th ed. 1990). See generally infra notes 84-103
and accompanying text (explaining that the courts have been more supportive of men who
want to take responsibility for children after the mothers have given birth).
84. See JOAN H. HOLLINGER ET AL., ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE 1-1, § 2.02, 2-13 (1994).
[Flora child born out of wedlock, the consent of the biological mother, if living
is always necessary. But the consent of the biological father, if living, is
typically not required unless he has formally legitimated the child or otherwise
acknowledged his paternity . . . . [Further, unwed fathers are not]
presumptively entitled to the legal right to consent to their child's adoption.
Id.
85. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
86. See id. at 645.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
91. See id. at 246.
92. Id. at 248-49. The natural father, Quilloin, never married or established a home with
the mother, Walcott. See id. at 247. The child was in Walcott's custody and control for the
child's entire life. See id After marrying and living as a family unit for nine years, Walcott
consented to the adoption of her child by her new husband. See id. Thus, no familial
relationship existed between Quilloin and Walcott.
93. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
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years, during which time they had their two children.94 Mohammed
then left Caban and married another man.95 After two years of
marriage, Mohammed instituted adoption proceedings so that her
husband could adopt her children, seeking to cut off all of Caban's
rights and obligations as a father.96 The decision in Caban was
consistent with Quilloin in that the focus continued to be on the
existence of the nuclear family. In Caban, the Court distinguished
between the natural father's simple biological and social relation-
ship with his children and the existence of a nuclear family with the
second husband.97
In Lehr v. Robertson the Supreme Court reaffirmed the decision
in Quilloin.98 In Lehr, the mother deliberately kept her child away
from the father.99 Because no actual parental relationship existed
between the father and the child, the Court found that the father
had no right to custody.00
Although the Supreme Court has attempted to remedy
problems associated with putative fathers' rights, the Court has
failed to enunciate a clear test when there is no established
relationship between the father and his child.'' When an actual
relationship is established, however, courts have generally favored
giving rights to the father, but only after the mother has renounced
hers.' °2 "States are now left with having to discern how to apply the
broad-based holdings from Stanley to Lehr where the father has not
94. See id. at 382.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 383-84.
97. See Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood, 40
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 637, 657 (1993).
98. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) (stating that "[t]he difference between
the developed parent-child relationship that was implicated in Stanley and Caban, and the
potential relationship involved in Quillion and this case, is both clear and significant.").
99. See id. at 268-69. Justice White noted in the dissent that the mother did not respond
to contact from the father and moved many times, thus making it difficult for the father to
keep in contact with his child. See id.
100. See id. at 248.
101. See Susan Swingle, Comment, Rights of Unwed Fathers and the Best Interests of the
Child: Can These Competing Interests Be Harmonized? Illinois' Putative Father Registry
Provides an Answer, 26 LOy. U. CHI. L.J. 703, 720 (1995).
[A]bsent a putative father registry, an unwed father must actively participate
in the support and rearing of his child in order to maintain any parental rights
in an adoption proceeding involving his child. Once he has created this
relationship, these cases indicate that he has established a liberty interest in
his relationship with his child.
Id.
102. See id. See generally Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (explaining the
secondary nature of the unwed father's rights); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978)
(same); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (same); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248
(1983) (same).
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established a relationship with his child.""0 3 Subsequently, a father
who has not, or can not, pursue a relationship with the child the
mother wants to give up for adoption loses all rights of custody of
that child. If the mother, however, decides to keep the child and
she needs support, the father is expected to be economically
responsible for the child.
C. Fathers' Rights and the Irrebutable Presumption of Paternity
Until recently, the common law presumption that a father of a
child is naturally the husband of the child's mother was the
established "law of the land."0 4 In Stanley, the Supreme Court
established a balancing test for cases where the father of the child
was not the husband of the mother.' °5 This test requires courts to
weigh the biological father's interests against the state's interests
in strengthening the family and securing the welfare of the child.' 6
Through this "balancing test," courts may deny the natural father
any legal rights over his offspring if the state's interests are
greater.
07
The most recent consideration by the Supreme Court of unwed
fathers' reproductive rights occurred in 1989, in the context of
California's law on the presumption of paternity. 0 8 In Michael H.,
the Supreme Court's decision rested on factors such as history and
tradition, rather than on factors such as biological parenthood and
an established parental relationship. 10 9 Thus, the Court preserved
the "sanctity" of the marital family at the expense of the rights of
103. Janet Ann Briseno, Note, Idaho's Putative Father Registry Statue: Is There Really
an Opportunity Interest for Putative Fathers?, 33 IDAHO L. REV. 415, 430 (1997); cf Swingle,
supra note 101, at 724 ("In general, the Court has been content to allow the states to progress
individually in deciding what laws provide the most reasonable distribution of individual
rights in adoptions," thus leaving the potential for great uncertainty).
104. See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 253 (1995) ("At
common law, ... [a] man obtained parental rights only through marriage.... Recent
Supreme Court cases involving parental rights of unwed fathers suggest that legal paternity
continues to depend more on the father's relationship with his children's mother than on a
genetic tie with the children."); see also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989)
(upholding the presumption that the man married to a child's mother is the child's father).
105. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650-51 (1972).
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 110.
109. See id. at 123-24 ("Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity
of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition.") (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (Powell,
J., plurality opinion).
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the natural father of an "adulterously conceived" child.1 0 Michael
H. "exemplif[ies] the Court's inability to craft a clear and succinct
analysis of the boundaries of an unwed father's liberty interest in
his relationship with his child.""' The plurality opinion in Michael
H. also determined that the father's interest in his child was
ultimately a matter of state law, not constitutional law, thereby
allowing room for great differences among opinions." 2
Even with the precedent set by Michael H., many states have
concluded that if blood tests determine that one person is not the
father, then he should be excluded from involvement as a
"father.""' This progression may be the only "right step" state
courts are taking. If the "father" of the child (by the presumptive
paternity statutes) is found not to be the biological father of the
child, then he would no longer be considered a potential father, able
to pay child support." 4 However, despite the fact that states are
finally recognizing that the presumptive paternity laws may be
rather outdated, stringent measures requiring proof that a man is
the father, via blood tests, together with the finding of an expert," 5
demonstrate the residual effects of the outdated tradition."
6
All of these factors epitomize the law's focus on the father as a
source of financial responsibility for the children he creates, while
ignoring his right to make procreative decisions. These laws and
traditions, while empowering to the women who they aid, create a
legal and financial obstacle that unwed fathers must unfairly
endure. o
110. See id. at 128-29 (explaining that the Court did not recognize the biological father as
having any relationship or legal right to a relationship with the child). The father essentially
was denied the right to be a father simply because he was not the husband of his child's
mother.
111. Swingle, supra note 101, at 723.
112. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 129-30 ("It is a question of legislative policy and not
constitutional law whether California will allow the presumed parenthood of a couple
desiring to retain a child conceived within and born into their marriage to be rebutted.").
113. Many paternity statutes require a court to exclude a putative father if blood tests
reveal he could not be the biological father. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7554 (West 1998);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-126(e)(I) (1998); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 810 (1998); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 19-7-40(c) (West 1998); IDAHO CODE § 7- 1116(5) (1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-14-6-3
(West 1998).
114. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7554 (West 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-126(e)(I) (1998);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 810 (1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 19-7-40(c) (West 1998); IDAHO CODE
§ 7- 1116(5) (1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-14-6-3 (West 1998).
115. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-14-6-3 (West 1998) (requiring a blood test and an
expert finding to determine paternity).
116. By the plain meaning of some statutes, blood tests are not enough; state codes
mandate the testimony of an expert as well. See, e.g., id.
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D. All of the Economic Burden
While men have no choice in the decision to "bear" a child," 7
they also have no say in choosing when not to "bear" a child. If a
father decides he does not want to bring a child into the world, post-
conception, he is unable to "opt out" or even to contract out of the
responsibility for that child." 8 Society decidedly has given repro-
ductive protection to women and yet has placed reproductive blame
on men.
In State Department of Human Services v. T.D.G., a divorced
couple decided that the mother would raise, and would be solely
responsible for, the child with whom she was pregnant at the time
of the couple's divorce." 9 The Court of Appeals, however, invali-
dated the contract between the ex-husband and the ex-wife and
held that a mother could not contract out of her child's right to
financial support. 2 ° The father in that case, had no recourse to not
be a father, at least in an economic sense.
Professor Totz argues that it takes two to make a child and
that it should take two to make the decisions related to that
child. 2' In the establishment of unwed parents' rights, however,
unwed fathers are expected to bear the financial burden of the child
while the mothers are given the power to be the decision-makers
because they are usually also the caretakers of the children.'22
117. See Ponter v. Ponter, 342 A.2d 574, 578 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975) ("[Wlomen are
individual persons with certain and absolute constitutional rights. Included within those
rights is the right to procure an abortion or other operation without her husband's consent.");
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2829-31 (1992) (explaining that a husband's
right to know about his wife's abortion would be an undue burden on the woman); Coleman
v. Coleman, 471 A.2d 1115, 1120 (Md. App. 1984) (finding that a woman "is most definitely
entitled, as a matter of right, to a medically induced abortion during the first trimester,
notwithstanding the objections of the State or any other person, firm, corporation or
association.").
118. See generally State Dep't of Human Serv. v. T.D.G., 861 P.2d 990 (Okla. 1993)
(holding that an unwed mother may not, through a settlement agreement, relieve a putative
father of his obligation to support his minor child).
119. See id. at 991.
120. See id.
121. See Totz, supra note 9, at 150 ("Two persons who consensually engage in sexual
relations may have more than one intention. They may intend to jointly create a child, or
they may intend to merely engage in recreational sexual activities. The individuals may also
have mixed intentions.") (citation omitted).
122. But see Levesque, Targeting "Deadbeat" Dads, supra note 12, at 25 ("Men are now
being pictured as important, nurturing family members .. ").
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The states' focus on recovering the money it has expended on
child care113 shifts the burden from the indigent mother to the
fugitive father. This displacement, which creates problems that
accompany the moral dilemma and breakdown of the family,
12 4
places an economic burden on fathers. Moreover, paternal identifi-
cation laws, such as Virginia's, only overload them.
IV. THE UNWED FATHER'S RESPONSIBILITIES WITH
REGARD TO AFDC
While unwed fathers are not afforded the same rights as unwed
mothers in decisions regarding their children, they are expected
nonetheless to fulfill their economic duties associated with the
rearing of a child. 2 ' Reforms in welfare laws have required men to
pay in order to help support the mothers of their children, if
needed.'26 Regardless of whether this reform is part of a fair and
just system, lost in the process still exists an unfairly targeted
group: unwed fathers.
Virginia's newly reformed parental identification requirement
(where women have to "cooperate" in locating the fathers of their
illegitimate children'27 for receipt of public assistance funds) is
exactly the type of legislation that is designed to target unwed
fathers. While the legislative intent is laudable 2 ' and mirrors
123. See, e.g., Welfare Recipients Feel States' Power; For Tough Paternity Identification
Rules, the Rate of Mother's Compliance Is High, RICHMOND-TIMES DISPATCH, Apr. 27, 1997,
at B1 thereinafter Welfare Recipients]. "It's critical to bring in every dollar the child
deserves,' said Scott Oostdyk, deputy secretary for the Department of Health and Human
Resources. 'It's fine to know the name of the father, but the ... goal is to locate him and
collect child support.'"). See also supra note 60.
124. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text. By categorizing men as the
"breadwinners" and women as the caretakers, even though not intentionally, the "family"
and the "best interests of the child" are no longer factors looked at with regard to law-
making. Instead, there is an individualized tendency to displace the burden of who is going
to take care of the child, physically, emotionally and financially.
125. See Totz, supra note 9, at 148 (explaining that it is presumed that when a man
decides to "have sex with a woman," he decides that he will be responsible for any and all
consequences associated with procreating); Peter D. Feaver et al., Sex as Contract: Abortion
and Expanded Choice, 5 STAN. L. & POLY' REV. 211, 218 (1992-93) (presuming that fathers
have implicitly agreed to provide for the children they help to conceive).
126. See 42 U.S.C. § 606(b) (1988).
127. See VA. ADMIN. CODE § 22 VAC 40-35-30(C) (West 1998).
128. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (noting the legislative intent behind the
establishment of welfare reform).
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national trends in welfare reform,'29 it is not consistent with
possible, essential constitutional protections for unwed fathers.'
Arguing from the mother's perspective, feminists contend that
because the state requires women to identify the father of their
children in order to receive assistance, women will be discouraged
from seeking this public assistance.13' The fear is also that women
may merely feel encouraged to "guess" the father, if they are unsure
of his actual identity, in order to receive their weekly check."' Such
guessing would therefore decrease women's integrity as they would
be acting solely out of monetary concerns.
More troubling, however, are the cases where the mother never
knew for certain who the father of her child was. If women are
required to list in good faith the person they believe to be the
father, then a heavy burden may shift to the unwed fathers, as it
would be up to them to disprove their paternity. This phenomenon
could pose a significant burden which would be decidedly difficult
to surmount. The majority of fathers in these situations are poor
and may not be able to withstand the loss of part of their salary.133
This situation would intensify if the fathers were forced to battle
the state government to prove their lack of paternity. 13 4
These negative repercussions unwed fathers encounter are not
merely theoretical. One mother, facing the requirement that she
identify the father of her child, first named her ex-husband, only to
find blood tests proved otherwise.' 35 Next, she identified another
man, also shown through blood tests not to be the father.136 Finally,
she pointed to one other possibility, identifying the man only as
129. See 1995 Floor Debate, supra note 58 and accompanying text (explaining how Virginia
is attempting to lead the nation in the new wave of welfare reform).
130. Cf Erbe, supra note 3, at 29 (suggesting that perhaps through the Equal Protection
Clause, by a heightened scrutiny classification for gender, men, who are forced into
"fatherhood," are a "protected class" and hence, should be protected).
131. But see Welfare Recipients, supra note 123, at B1 ("[Sltate officials said 99.6% of
welfare mothers have complied with Virginia's paternity identification rules, which are
among the toughest in the nation.").
132. See, e.g., infra notes 135-41 and accompanying text.
133. See GENERALACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERSTATE CHILD SUPPoRT: MOTHERS RECEIVING
LESS SUPPORT FROM OUT-OF-STATE FATHERS, GAO/IHRD 92-39FS19 (1992) (finding that the
majority of fathers who do not pay child support to custodial mothers who have court orders
do not pay because they are unable to pay).
134. Even though the states generally pay for the paternity testing, the "cooperation" in
Virginia seems to encourage guessing in order to keep receiving AFDC payments.
Otherwise, women may be penalized by losing benefits. See supra note 62 and accompanying
text (explaining the harsh penalties women face if they are unable to give the Department
of Social Services required information).
135. See Taylor, supra note 11, at Al.
136. See id.
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"Mark," a man with whom she had had a one-night stand.137 Her
benefits from AFDC were subsequently taken away due to her
definitive lack of identification of the father. 138 In a similar
scenario, another woman had her application for AFDC benefits
turned down because, having been overly promiscuous, she was
unable to identify any particular man with whom she had had
intercourse with at the time of her daughter's conception. 39
The outcomes of this "identify or else" approach can, as
exemplified here, place enormous undue burdens on innocent men.
While one of these women was "guessing" and the other one was
unable to be accurate, both were "punished" for being unable to
identify the fathers of their children. 141 Under the new Virginia
legislation, requiring more than a guess could lead women to
identify those men about whom they know the most information,
rather than those men who are in fact the fathers, thereby burden-
ing innocent men.14
1
Critics argue that this type of legislation reverts back to the
"worthy person" standard, 142 found in the earliest welfare laws.
State legislators argue that the burden of caring for "ill-conceived
children" should not fall on them. 143 In "cracking down" on mothers
who do not want to cooperate, however, states may actually
encourage mothers to take any means necessary to receive aid.'14
Other critics argue that the establishment of paternity
"remains a weak area in child-support enforcement: Despite 1995's
record paternity numbers, the fathers of more than 2 million
children on welfare still had not been identified."45  Because
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See Cheryl Wetzstein, Welfare Reform Uncovers Deadbeat Dads; Women Have More
Incentive to Help, WASH. TIMEs, Feb. 13, 199S, at A2 (explaining that the "tell-us-the-father-
or-lose-your-benefits" welfare rule has been on the. books for years, but many mothers
learned to tell authorities enough to cooperate, yet not enough to find the fathers).
142. See Levesque, Targeting "Deadbeat" Dads, supra note 12, at 9 (defining the worthy
person standard).
143. See supra note 60 (describing the intentions of the Virginia Legislature when
establishing the new welfare laws).
144. See Wetzstein, supra note 141, at A2 (reiterating that faced with a cut in benefits,
some women have admitted to "misspelling" a man's name in the past or have introduced
new information about a man's address or job that they just "found out yesterday").
145. Id. "In 1995, a record 659,000 fathers were identified, according to the federal Office
of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE). An estimated 243,000 additional fathers were
identified in hospital programs." Id.
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enforcing payment of child support burdens the public purse,146
Virginia and other states are strongly motivated to encourage
women to identify the fathers.147
Two things are clear from the changes in the welfare laws in
Virginia: (1) unwed mothers are now identifying the fathers of
their children; and (2) the state is increasing its revenues while
decreasing the amount of money it has to pay out in public assis-
tance.148 While these changes seem to be positive, the issues of
inequity remain for unwed fathers who are now the "pocket books"
for these welfare reforms.
V. CONCLUSION
With the new focus on unwed fathers as the "pocket books" to
support AFDC programs, a dangerous trend may create a slippery
slope which society will not be able to stop. The message sent to
unwed mothers choosing to carry their children is to go ahead and
have the-baby, and if they can not pay for it, the state will help
them obtain financial support from the fathers. While the number
of teen pregnancies has decreased'49 and the laws currently require
people to take responsibility for their actions, unwed fathers' rights
remain on unequal footing.
When a woman chooses not to keep a baby, either by giving it
up for adoption or by aborting it, the biological father has no say in
that decision. Even in the few cases where the courts have found
it to be a decision in which the father should have a role to play,
mothers still have found ways of having abortions or going through
with adoptions, without the father's input.150
146. Cf id. ("In 1995, the best year yet, there were 10.4 million welfare-related child-
support cases, the OCSE said. But only 5.4 million-52%--had a court order to collect any
money.").
147. The intent of the legislature is clear-the changes in welfare reform over the past five
years have relieved the taxpayers. See 1995 Floor Debate, supra note 58.
148. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text (explaining that legislatures are
motivated by an increase in access to the "public purse" and by the high identification of
welfare illegitimate children).
149. See Monthly Vital Statistics Report (visited Feb. 8, 1999) <httpd/www.cdc.gov/
nchswww/releases/98facts/98sheets/tnbrth96.htm.>. Between 1991 and 1996, teen-age births
fell in all states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands. Declines ranged from 6%
to 29% and were statistically significant in all but three states. See id. Nationally, the birth
rate for teenagers continued to decline in 1996, and has now fallen by 12% to 54.4 births per
1000 women aged fifteen through nineteen years, compared with 62.1 births in 1991. See id.
150. See supra notes 78, 102 (stressing that men have little to no reproductive rights in
abortion and adoption situations).
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One solution would be to require the father's identification at
the beginning of the pregnancy in cases where mothers have not
been victims of rape or incest. This phenomenon would reduce the
"unknowns," even for a woman who has had several sexual
partners. 5 ' Requiring a woman to identify all of the possible
fathers of her child, at the time she becomes pregnant, should
afford the father an opportunity to decide whether he wants to be
a part of the child's life. If he does not wish to be involved in the
child's life, he should still be afforded the opportunity to be involved
in decisions that will be made before the child's birth or abortion.
152
Requiring identification at the time of pregnancy is one way to
achieve equal protection for both genders, with regard to procre-
ative and economic rights. With this option, if a woman chooses to
have her baby out-of-wedlock, she will also have to come to terms
with whether the father of her baby wants to have a baby out-of-
wedlock. If the father does not, the woman will remain the
unilateral decision-maker, although she will not-unilaterally be the
responsible party. Indeed, according to current law, if a mother can
no longer support her baby, the father of her child is ultimately
responsible.
A second proposition to better address the plight of unwed
fathers is to view sex as a contract. 153 If sex is viewed as a contract,
then "[tihe burden is placed on the parties to make sure that their
intent concerning their coital agreement is known."'54 Thus, the
courts would no longer have to rely on constitutional or Congressio-
nal interpretations. "The courts could establish a requirement for
a written covenant, analogous to a prenuptial agreement, or, more
likely, accept oral contracts as binding." 1
55
151. See Richards, supra note 8, at 3 ("Proponents argue that since women can decide
whether to have a child against the will of the father, then a man should have a right to
terminate his parenthood legally.").
152. A putative father registry offers an option to the father. If mothers are required to
establish a list of putative fathers at the onset of their pregnancies, there would be more
room and time for the unwed fathers to make decisions concerning the life they helped
create. See Fred A. Bernstein, This Child Does Have Two Mothers... and a Sperm Donor
with Visitation, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 2 (1996) ("In our society, fatherhood is
defined by a 'man's biological relationship with the child, his legal or social relationship with
the child's mother, and.., his social and psychological commitment to the child.'") (citation
omitted). But see Richards, supra note 8, at 3 (claiming that men are seen only as sperm
donors). Thus, some fear that with "[a] simple stroke of a judge's pen within, say, the first
trimester ofpregnancy and the guy is free. No threat of future child support payments. No
need for weekend visitation or worrying about dad-kid bonding. No responsibility for
creating and abandoning a child." Id.
153. See Feaver et al., supra note 125, at 218.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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The current trends and decisions of today's courts, however, are
no less ambiguous, just less fair to men.'56 According to contempo-
rary law, the bottom line revolves around the understanding that
unwed fathers are simply not given equal footing for making
reproductive decisions.
While recognizing the problems of the historically "deadbeat
dad" and the ease with which men can escape responsibility in most
cases, the movement for equal gender rights is impeded by legisla-
tion that targets unwed fathers to pay for children they did not
want. In an effort to help those fathers who wish to keep their
children, and also to help those fathers who want to participate in
financial decisions regarding their children, legislatures should not
place the sole economic burden on unwed fathers.'57
The journey toward equal rights for women has come a long
way. While the legal system has marched toward equality for
women on the one hand, legal traditions remain that unfairly
burden men. Laws that support women who are irresponsible
"procreators," while punishing the men who are doing the same,
create a dichotomy in which men and women are not treated
equally.'58 Rather, the presumption that men are the solitary
"breadwinners" and are ultimately responsible for the irresponsible
actions of women reverts legal theory back to one hundred years
156. See supra Parts III.A-D.
157. See Young, supra note 5, at 6D.
The largely unnoticed irony is that these are precisely the arguments the right-
to-life movement makes about a woman's right to choose. And these are the
arguments denounced as evidence of a misogynistic desire to rob women of their
sexuality and their freedom. When directed at women, 'You play, you pay' is
widely regarded as callous and punitive; when directed at men, it is widely
accepted.
Id.
158. See Smart, supra note 15, at 19 ("Taken out of context the father's rights movements
might pose little threat to the advances made by women over the last century."); Kohm,
supra note 15, at 117.
The problem with post-modern feminism is the myopic insistence on the concept
that reproductive capacities are the only meaningful differences between men
and women, and therefore are the "barrier" to be overcome for full participation
in the male world. Particularly when combined with the feminist emphasis on
sexual 'freedom,' abortion becomes a necessary component of the mainstream
feminist vision.
Id. (citation omitted); cf MUKTI JAIN CAMPION, WHO'S FIT TO BE A PARENT? 218 (1995) ("It is
a threatening thought to many that the hunter-gatherer is turning soft-who will be
providing macho men to populate the armies of the future if men start abandoning their
aggressive, competitive roles honed in each other's company and turn instead to nappy
changing, cooking and wiping fevered brows?"). But cf Smart, supra note 15, at 19
([Alttempts to reduce women's rights to abortion and to give married and unmarried fathers
a voice in whether a termination should be permitted are part of a drive to reestablish men
as the source of authority in households.").
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ago-back to the idea that women are too incompetent to care for
themselves and thus cannot be held responsible for their actions."5 9
The seventy-plus years of equal rights for women should not be
taken for granted.60 If all "people" are created equal under the
Constitution, and in accordance with our country's laws, then
women and men should be making economic and reproductive
decisions together. 16' At the very least, the law should allow fathers
the opportunity to make decisions in such a manner.
KINDRA L. GROMELSKI
159. See NAFFINE, supra note 6, at 146.
What is wrong with anti-discrimination legislation framed . . . [as the
comparison of the complainant with a male comparator] is that its essential
purpose is to make women like men .... Practically speaking, this means that
women are denied any legal redress if they are unable to find a male with
whom to compare themselves. Obvious problems arise therefore when
discrimination relates to pregnancy and a woman must look around for a
pregnant man with whom to compare herself.
Id. See generally FARNSwORTH ET AL., SELECTIONS IN CONTRACT LAW (3d ed. 1995)
(explaining the presumption at common law that women were not competent to hold property
or to make contracts).
160. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (amending the Constitution to allow women to vote,
beginning in 1920). See generally Anne N. Constain & Steven Majstrovovic, Congress, Social
Movement and Public Opinion Multiple Origins of Women's Rights Legislation, 47 POL. RES.
Q. 111 (1994) (explaining that although the first wave of women's suffrage began at the turn
of the century, the modern women's rights movement continued an upward trend from 1958
through 1986).
161. See Feaver et al., supra note 125, at 218 ("Even if this routinely becomes a 'he
said/she said' situation, the idiosyncratic bargainer should at least have his/her day in
court.").
